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2 Outsiders Looking In 
OUTSIDERS LOOKING IN: THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
DISCOURSE OF EXCLUSION
“There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other 
flags but welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full 
freedom and opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of 
disloyalty into the very arteries of our national life…”
President Woodrow Wilson, Annual Address to Congress, December 
1915.
 “The Japanese race is an enemy race and while many second and third 
generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of United States 
citizenship, have become ‘Americanized’ the racial strains are undiluted.”
Lieutenant General John L. DeWitt, Final Report on the Japanese 
Evacuation from the West Coast, 1942.
“Citizens and noncitizens, even if equally dangerous, are not similarly 
situated.”
Justice Antonin Scalia dissenting in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 2004. 
“My view with regard to profiling noncitizens is different. Noncitizens are 
not expected to be loyal to the United States and so the concern with 
alienating them by profiling is less acute. No foreigner expects to be treated 
identically to a citizen.”
Judge Richard Posner’s blog comments about the considerations that should 
be taken into account when deciding whether to engage in racial profiling. 
OUTSIDERS LOOKING IN: AN INTRODUCTION
Shortly after the birth of our nation, Congress enacted the Alien 
Friends Act, which granted to President John Adams the power to detain 
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and deport aliens from any country deemed “dangerous to the country” 
without affording them due process of law.1 After the riots and criminal 
attacks on prominent public figures that took place subsequent to the end of 
World War I, the government ordered various raids directed at deporting 
aliens who sympathized with anarchist or communist ideals.2 In the wake of 
the attack on Pearl Harbor, President  Franklin Roosevelt ordered the 
internment of Japanese Americans in concentration camps with the alleged 
purpose of guaranteeing national security.3   As part of a sweeping 
government effort to quell terrorism after 9/11, President Bush signed an 
executive order allowing special military tribunals to try foreigners 
suspected of committing such acts.4  As a result, the military  facilities at 
Guantánamo Bay  are being primarily used as prisons for the indefinite 
detention of non-citizens designated by  President Bush as “enemy 
combatants.” 
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1 Officially called An Act Concerning Aliens,  ch. 58, 1 Stat. 570, 570-71 (1798)(expired in 
1800).  The act commonly known as the Alien Enemies Act, adopted at the same time as 
the Alien Friends Act,  provided that the president could detain and deport aliens of an 
enemy nation residing in the United States.  See An Act respecting Alien Enemies, ch. 66, 1 
Stat. 577 (1798)(codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §21).. 
2 Harlan Grant Cohen, Note, The (Un)favorable Judgment of History: Deportation 
Hearings, The Palmer Raids, and the Meaning of History, 78 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1431 (2003). 
3 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 102 (1943).
4 Elisabeth Bumiller and David Johnston, Bush Sets Option of Military Trials in Terrorist 
Cases, N.Y.TIMES, November 14, 2001 at A1.
  All of these governmental acts have one thing in common: they 
distinguish between “us” and “them,” “good guys” and “bad guys,” 
“friends” and “enemies,” “insiders” and “outsiders.” Near the end of the 
18th century, aliens (outsiders) enjoyed less constitutional freedoms than 
citizens (insiders). After Pearl Harbor, United States law distinguished 
between the Japanese people (them) and the American people (us). Today, 
in the post 9/11 world, those associated to so-called “fundamentalist 
Islam” (bad guys) are treated differently  than those who are supposedly 
willing to defend freedom (good guys). In light of these examples, it is hard 
to deny  that there has always existed, and still exists, an American legal 
discourse of exclusion. This discourse of exclusion has been repeatedly 
used to legitimate the adoption of measures that target certain groups of 
people primarily on the basis of their status as members of a particular 
class. Those who have been the focus of these measures have, despite their 
presence in the country, experienced what it feels like to be an outsider 
looking in.  
 The existence of this legal discourse of exclusion raises 
various important queries. What are the philosophical and historical roots of 
the governmental tendency to inequitably target certain groups of people as 
a way to safeguard the rest of the populace? Why is it that the State 
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typically makes use of discourses of exclusion in order to handle emergency 
situations, such as the turbulent riots that broke out in the United States 
after World War I or the frightening period that resulted after the attacks on 
the World Trade Center?  Is it judicious for government to 
disproportionately burden certain groups of the population when the 
security of the nation is at stake?  The purpose of this article is to explore 
these fundamental problems.  I will do so in four steps.
 In Part I, I will examine the political philosophy of various 
prominent European and American thinkers in order to explain why 
discourses of exclusion seem to lie at the heart  of social contract theories of 
the State.  This might  explicate why governments have always been seduced 
by the idea that it might be legitimate to safeguard the rights of some (the 
non-excluded) at the expense of the rights of others (the excluded). 
 The next part will be dedicated to briefly recounting several 
instances in which the government of the United States has placed unfair 
burdens on some groups of people in order to guarantee the safety  of the 
rest of the population.  I will focus on four cases, namely: the curtailing of 
the free speech rights of aliens during the Quasi-War of 1798, the 
persecution of political dissidents after both world wars, the branding of 
Japanese Americans as an “enemy race” that needed to be contained in 
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order to avoid another Pearl Harbor, and the recurrent attempt to treat 
suspected terrorists differently depending on whether or not they are 
American citizens.  This historical inquiry  will reveal that  the United States 
government has continuously engaged in the practice of inequitably 
burdening certain groups of people during times of actual or perceived 
emergency. 
 In Part  III I will attempt to demonstrate that the State cannot 
legitimate the use of an official discourse of exclusion by pointing to the 
existence of a state of emergency.  Even if one accepts that the government 
can justifiably  impose significant burdens on the population during times of 
emergency, it  does not follow that it can do so in an inequitable manner. 
Besides the fact that enacting measures that target certain groups of people 
is constitutionally suspect on various grounds,5 the benefits of making use 
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5 Measures targeting groups of people on the basis of their political ideals may contravene 
the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of speech and association.  See U.S. v. 
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).  If, on the other hand, the measure allows the government to 
search or detain the actor solely because he is a member of particular class, the measure 
could violate the Fourth Amendment, since it would allow the seizure or search of the 
person on the basis of his status and not on the constitutionally accepted ground of 
probable cause or, at the very least, reasonable suspicion. 
Measures that purport to punish otherwise non-criminal conduct or to aggravate 
the punishment of conduct that is already considered criminal exclusively because the 
actor’s status are also problematic. This would contradict the basic tenet that people should 
be punished for engaging in wrongful acts, not for being members of a particular class. 
This seems to run afoul the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Robinson v. California, 
370 U.S. 660 (1962). It should be pointed out,  however, that the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence with regard to the constitutionality of criminalizing conduct in view of the 
status of the alleged perpetrator is muddled, to say the least.  See, for example, Powell v. 
Texas, 392 U.S.  514 (1968). These types of measures could also be void because they 
unconstitutionally establish guilt by association alone. See Robel, supra.
of such measures do not outweigh the costs.  The short-term profits seem to 
be offset  by the fact  that trading their liberties for our wellbeing will render 
us less safe in the long run. Even though these types of measures might help 
prevent attacks against our nation in the near future, they may  also 
undermine our legitimacy both here and abroad.  Ultimately this has the 
potential of increasing our vulnerability  because it will most likely diminish 
cooperation from those who will probably be in a better position to furnish 
us with valuable information about possible attacks against our nation.6 
Finally, in Part IV, I will discuss the potential perils of attempting to 
inequitably target certain groups during times of emergency by examining 
and critiquing the recent enactment of a statute7  that authorizes the 
construction of a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border. Contrary to what its 
proponents have suggested, this measure, which asymmetrically requires 
Mexicans to assume a burden that is not imposed on our neighbors to the 
north, will likely augment the risks of a future terrorist  attack, not reduce 
them. 
I. DISCOURSES OF EXCLUSION AND CONTRACTARIANISM
8 Outsiders Looking In 
6 DAVID COLE, ENEMY ALIENS : DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN 
THE WAR ON TERRORISM XXII  (2003).
7 Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub.L. 109-367, §1, Oct. 26, 2006, 120 Stat. 2638, codified at 
8 U.S.C. 1103.
Discourses of exclusion find solid grounding in social-contract 
theories of the State. This is most evidently the case when the exclusionary 
discourse is employed to justify  inequitably targeting foreigners in order to 
maximize the rights of citizens.  There is ample support in the contractarian 
literature in favor of depriving aliens of liberties solely because of their 
status since, as Professor Gerald Neuman has correctly stated, foreigners, 
“by definition, began as outsiders to a particular social contract.”8  Hence, 
because of their condition as foreigners, aliens have no natural claim to 
sharing the rights that insiders enjoy as ratifiers of the societal pact.
Similarly, the liberal German philosopher Christian Wolff argued 
that non-citizens “are bound only to do and not to do the things which must 
be done or not done by  citizens at the time under the same circumstances, 
except in so far as particular laws introduce something else concerning 
foreigners”.9  In the same vein, the Swiss legal scholar Emerich de Vattel 
argued that aliens only  possessed those privileges that the State chose to 
give to them, thus making them members of an “inferior order” who, 
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8  Neuman, Gerald L., Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L.J. 909 (1991). 
9  2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM 153 (J. Drake 
trans. 1934) (cited in Gerald N. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 Yale L. J. 909, 925 
(1991) (emphasis added).
despite having the same obligations towards the government as citizens, had 
less rights.10
The tendency to exclude some people from the protection of our 
laws based on social contract theories of the state has also influenced the 
thinking of various American political scholars. At the turn of the 19th 
century, for example, the Federalist lawyer from New England, Harrison 
Gray Otis, stated that foreigners lied outside of the scope of the procedural 
and substantive safeguards conferred by the Constitution of the United 
States because said instrument only protected those who had been parties to 
the ratification.11 Likewise, a Federalist committee asserted that since “the 
Constitution was made for citizens . . . [aliens] have no rights under it, but 
remain in the country and enjoy the benefit of the laws . . . as a matter of 
favor and permission.”12  Consequently, the committee concluded that the 
rights of aliens may  be withdrawn whenever the Government believed that 
continuing to afford them with the same rights as citizens would be 
“dangerous” to the “general welfare.”13
10 Outsiders Looking In 
10 1 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL LAW 
§213 (1758).
11 Neuman, supra, note 9, at 929.
12 Id. 
13 Id.
A contractarian reading of the Constitution has also informed the 
opinion of several justices of the United States Supreme Court. Thus, in 
United States v. Verdugo Urquidez14, Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that 
non-resident aliens are not part of “the people” protected by  the Fourth 
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures because 
they  are “not part of [our] national community” and have not “otherwise 
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered part  of 
that community.”15   In doing so, he further suggested that non-resident 
aliens are also not part of “the people” whose rights to freedom of speech 
and association are protected by the First Amendment.16 
More recently, in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,17  Justice Scalia argued that 
citizens detained as enemy combatants have the right under the Suspension 
Clause of the Constitution to challenge the legality of their detention in 
federal court, whereas aliens do not.18  He arrived at this conclusion even 
though the text of the Suspension Clause remains silent as to whether or not 
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14 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
15 Id. at 265.   
16 If we take Justice Rehnquist’s conclusions seriously, it seems to follow that foreign 
journalists temporarily staying in the United States who are neither residents nor citizens 
do not have a constitutionally protected right to freedom of speech and press. 
17 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
18 Id. at xx.
aliens are included within the protection afforded by the provision.19  As 
usual, Justice Scalia grounded his position on an originalist  reading of the 
Constitution. Even though at first glance there seems to be no clear 
connection between originalism and contractarianism, it turns out  that, upon 
closer inspection, contractarianism is linked to most originalist theories of 
interpretation.  Since social contract theory “seems to have informed our 
Nation's founders,”20  any philosophy  of constitutional adjudication that 
purports to appeal to the meaning of the text at the time of the founding will 
be underpinned by contractarian understandings of the obligations that the 
State owes to citizens and non-citizens.21 
 Once it  is accepted that social contract theories can serve to 
legitimize the practice of discriminating between citizens and aliens, it is 
not difficult to imagine how these theories can also lead to justifying the 
practice of inequitably targeting a group of people even though they are 
citizens.  Although citizens have a prima facie right to share whatever 
benefits might be afforded to people who are insiders to the compact upon 
which societal life was erected, they may lose this right if they can be linked 
12 Outsiders Looking In 
19 U.S. CONST, art. 1, §9. 
20 Davis v. Fulton County, 884 F.Supp. 1245, 1254 n. 7 (E.D.Ark.1995).
21 See, for example, Michael C. Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Normative 
Constitutional Theory: The Case of Original Meaning, 85 Georgetown L. J. 1765, 1774 
(1999)(stating that the political theory underlying originalism is “a form of social contract 
theory”).
in some way to those who are not bound by the social-contract.22  This is 
particularly the case when the government determines that the societal 
group to which the citizens have been linked poses a significant danger to 
the rest of the citizenry  and to the continued existence of social life 
according to the terms of the original pact.  Thus, as Professor David Cole 
has lucidly  argued, it is usually quite easy for the State to “cross the citizen-
non-citizen divide” and conclude that certain citizens should be inequitably 
targeted by the government on the basis of a diagnosis of dangerousness 
that stems from their racial (i.e. Japanese internment during WWII) or 
political (i.e. McCarthyism) ties to people who are believed to pose a threat 
to the rest of the populace.23
Since the political philosophy undergirding the legal discourse of 
exclusion is germane to the social contract theory  that informed the ideas of 
our founding fathers, it  should come as no surprise that the United States 
government has recurrently made use of the logic that flows from the 
contractarian considerations that have been detailed here.  Undoubtedly, an 
understanding of the theoretical roots of the discourses of exclusion that 
give rise to the use of measures that disproportionately  burden certain 
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22 People may not be bound by the terms of the social-contract either because they were 
never parties to the compact or because they have decided to live outside of its terms.
23 COLE, supra note 6, at 85-87.
groups of people helps us to explain why our political institutions have 
repeatedly yielded to this exclusionary logic.  It does not, however, provide 
us with a completely adequate account of why the use of such measures has 
been so seductive during times of perceived emergency.  Such an account 
can only be afforded upon an examination of the historical instances in 
which our government has opted to target certain groups as a way to protect 
the rest of the populace.  This is precisely  the purpose of Part II of the 
article.
II. OUTSIDERS V. INSIDERS - THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE WITH LEGAL 
DISCOURSES OF EXCLUSION 
A. FOREIGNERS (AND THEIR FRIENDS) AS OUTSIDERS
1. FRENCH ALIENS AS OUTSIDERS - THE QUASI WAR OF 1798 AND THE 
ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS
The first time that the United States officially  toyed with a discourse 
of exclusion on the basis of non-racist motivations was in 1798.24 
Francophobia infiltrated the hearts and minds of Americans soon after 
diplomatic relations with three French intermediaries turned sour during the 
spring of 1798.  The public was irate after learning that the French agents 
14 Outsiders Looking In 
24 It should go without saying that our government employed a legal discourse of exclusion 
against black slaves from the time of our founding until well into the 20th century. This 
discourse of exclusion was grounded on racism and prejudice. The focus of this article, 
however, is documenting and critiquing the American government’s attempt to justify the 
use of such discourses by appealing to seemingly neutral and non-racist arguments.  Thus,  I 
will focus on examining governmental measures that inequitably target certain social 
groups on the basis of allegedly non-prejudiced grounds. 
had demanded a substantial loan from the U.S. government,  a formal 
apology  from President John Adams  and a bribe before they would engage 
in peace negotiations with the United States.  This breakdown in diplomacy 
between the two countries, which came to be known as the XYZ affair, 
fueled anti-French sentiment in America and gave the faltering presidency 
of John Adams a much needed boost.25 
 After the Federalist Congress was informed of the XYZ 
affair in April 1798, a military showdown with the French seemed 
inevitable.  Even though there was never a formal declaration of war, 
hostilities between both countries began in 1798 and lasted until 1800.  This 
conflict, which was fought almost entirely at sea, is referred to as the Quasi-
War of 1798.26  In the wake of the Quasi-War, Congress enacted the Alien 
Friends and Sedition Acts with the alleged purpose of protecting Americans 
from attacks from aliens of “enemy powers” (i.e. French aliens).  These 
Acts were manifestly designed to discriminate against French aliens and 
their sympathizers solely on the basis of their status as members of an 
enemy race that was considered to be dangerous to the peace and security of 
the United States.  While the Alien Friends Act proved to be a useful tool to 
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25 JAMES F. SIMON, WHAT KIND OF NATION: THOMAS JEFFERSON, JOHN MARSHALL, AND 
THE EPIC STRUGGLE TO CREATE A UNITED STATES 41 (2002).
26 See Douglas J. Sylvester, International Law as Sword or Shield? Early American 
Foreign Policy and the Law of Nations, 32 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol. 1 (Fall 1999).
silence French aliens who were critical of the administration, the passage of 
the Sedition Act provided the government with an equally powerful 
mechanism for suppressing American critics.27   The Sedition Act was 
primarily  directed toward destroying Jeffersonian Republican opposition to 
the Federalist  Party.28 Various well-known Jeffersonians, mostly journalists 
and editors, were indicted for violating its provisions.29
 History has not been kind to the Alien and Sedition Acts. 
President Jefferson, whose Republican Party ousted the Federalists from 
power in the election of 1800, believed that the laws were unconstitutional 
and did not renew the Alien Friends Act after it  expired in 1800.  The 
Sedition Act was also allowed to expire.30  Most scholars have since agreed 
with Jefferson’s assessment of the acts.  Similarly, the Supreme Court has 
stated in dicta that “[a]lthough the Sedition Act was never tested in this 
Court, the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court  of 
history”.31
 The enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts marked the 
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27 James Morton Smith,  The Enforcement of the Alien Friends Act of 1798,  The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 at 85 (June 1954).
28 Simon, supra note 25 at 51.
29 See id. at 52-55 for a sampling of those indicted.
30 ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65 
(1991). 
31 New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964).
beginning of a sorry chapter in American law and politics in which specific 
groups of people have been forced into the status of outsiders looking in. 
By branding French aliens and their American sympathizers as members of 
an enemy class whose civil liberties could be curtailed in order to protect 
the peace and security of the rest of the populace, the government paved the 
way for the enactment of future statutes that legitimized measures that 
inequitably target certain people in the name of national security.  It should 
thus come as no surprise that with the advent of World War I, the United 
States again resorted to a discourse of exclusion in an attempt to protect the 
country from internal and external threats. 
2. RUSSIAN ALIENS AS OUTSIDERS – THE PALMER RAIDS
 Less than a year after the cessation of World War I hostilities, 
an elaborate scheme to mail 36 bombs to well-known statesmen and 
politicians was exposed.  The targets included Supreme Court Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, entrepreneurs J.P. Morgan and John D. Rockefeller, and 
the Attorney General at the time, A. Mitchell Palmer.32  In June of 1919, 
nine bombs were detonated in eight different American cities, including one 
in Palmer’s Washington, D.C. home.33  The attacks came at a time in which 
the American people were becoming increasingly suspicious of anyone who 
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32 Cohen, supra note 2, n. 104.
33 Id. at n. 108.  See also COLE, supra note 6, at 118.
advocated anarchist or communist ideals, particularly foreigners. 34
 Governmental reaction to the events was swift.  Less than six 
months after the bomb scares, Attorney  General Palmer and the chief of the 
Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation, J. Edgar Hoover, ordered law 
enforcement authorities to engage in a series of raids against members of 
the alleged radical groups who were thought to be behind the attacks.  The 
raids were undertaken without regard to traditional principles of 
constitutional law.  The venerable Fourth Amendment requirement that 
there be probable cause before governmental authorities engage in a search 
was blatantly  ignored.  Instead, the chief criterion for determining whether 
someone ought to be arrested or searched was if he was a member of certain 
groups, including the Union of Russian Workers, the Communist Party, and 
the Communist Labor Party.”35 
 Unsurprisingly, the vast  majority of the people targeted 
during the Palmer Raids were foreigners, especially  Russians and Eastern 
Europeans.36  The raids took place during a time in which many Americans 
believed that a Bolshevik revolution in the United States was unavoidable. 
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34 See Cohen, supra note 2, at 1454-55.
35 Id. at 1458.
36 Law enforcement officials were instructed that “[o]nly aliens should be arrested; if 
American citizens are taken by mistake, their cases should be immediately referred to the 
local authorities.”  Colyer v. Skeffington, 265 F.17 18 Ohio Law Rep. 241, 37 n.2 (D. 
Mass. 1920), rev’d sub nom. Skeffington v. Katzeff, 277 F.129 (1st Cir. 1922)
As a result of the widespread hysteria that accompanied the predictions of a 
communist coup in our country, it  seemed natural at the time to focus the 
nation’s investigative efforts on Russian aliens and their sympathizers. 
Thus, equipped with the tools provided by  the Alien Control Act of 1918,37 
thousands of Russian non-citizens were arrested on the basis of their 
suspected ties with radical anarchist or communist groups.  In fact, many 
people were arrested simply because their names appeared on the 
membership lists of local Russian or Communist Clubs.38  In a patent denial 
of due process, the Immigration Bureau rules regarding aliens’ access to 
counsel at the subsequent deportation hearings were amended to deny the 
aliens this right as well as the right to examine the evidence to be used 
against them until the inspector decided that “the hearing had proceeded 
sufficiently in the development of the facts to protect  the government’s 
interests.”39
 As with the targeting of French aliens during the Quasi-War 
of 1798, governmental authorities in the post World War I period resorted to 
imposing unfair burdens on certain groups of people in an attempt to secure 
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37 Act of Oct. 16, 1918, ch. 186, 40 Stat. 1012 (repealed June, 1952).
38 This was done without regard to how the names came to be on the lists.  In some cases, 
the arrested non-citizens legitimately had no idea they were “members” of the Communist 
party.  See, COLE supra note 6, at 119-21.
39 Colyer, 265 F.17 at 46.  
the nation during a time of perceived emergency.  Up  to this point, however, 
only the liberties of non-citizens (French aliens and Russian aliens) were 
being eroded in an effort to protect the country.  Things would change when 
less than twenty years later the government decided that  it could no longer 
ensure security by targeting only  foreigners.  A special committee of 
Congress had started investigating “unpatriotic” activities and American 
citizens would no longer be safe from investigation solely on the basis of 
their status as members of a particular class. 
B. AMERICANS AS OUTSIDERS  
1. POLITICAL DISSIDENTS AS OUTSIDERS - ANTI-COMMUNISM AND THE 
SECOND RED SCARE
 Things settled down for a while after the Palmer Raids. 
American authorities had arrested nearly ten thousand Russian aliens 
suspected of having radical ties and sent a couple of hundred back to the 
Soviet Union in “Soviet  Arks.”40  With the fears of a Bolshevik revolution 
on United States soil dissipating, most Americans were content to sit back 
and enjoy the Roaring Twenties.  Before long, however, we were focused on 
a new enemy. With the events leading up to World War II unfolding in rapid 
succession, concern over Nazi Germany emerged and feelings of unease 
about communist Russia resurfaced.  Fearing that some of the pernicious 
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40 Cohen, supra note 2, at 1460.
ideals underlying these political movements had started to contaminate 
people on this side of the Atlantic, the House of Representatives, with 
Congressmen Martin Dies, Jr. and Samuel Dickstein in the lead, created the 
Special Committee on Un-American Activities (later HUAC) in 1938 to 
investigate unpatriotic behavior.41 
 Perhaps because of America’s marriage of convenience with 
Russia during the Second World War, the HUAC’s monitoring activities 
were relatively minor in comparison to what was to take place after the 
defeat of the Axis alliance in 1945.  Fueled by Churchill’s famous warning 
about the descent  of an iron curtain through Europe,42 the Republican Party, 
which had soundly trounced the Democrats in the elections of 1946,43 
revamped the HUAC and embarked on an unprecedented effort to detect 
homegrown threats. 
Since the numerous acts of the HUAC are well documented, there is 
no need to detail them here.44  A couple of them are worth mentioning, 
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41 William M. Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism: The 
Background of Dennis v. United States, 2001 Sup. Ct. Rev. 375, 398-99.
42 “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across 
the Continent.”, Winston Churchill, Speech at Westminster College, Fulton, MO (Mar. 5, 
1946).
43 The Republican campaign capitalized on the growing fear of Communist expansion in 
America.
44  See WALTER GOODMAN, THE COMMITTEE: THE EXTRAORDINARY CAREER OF OTHE 
HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, (1968).  
though. In 1947, for example, the committee grew increasingly suspicious 
about the existence of a Soviet spy  network in Hollywood.  This prompted it 
to launch an investigation with the purpose of determining whether various 
members of the Hollywood community identified themselves as 
communists. The probe was so far-reaching that not even ten year old child 
star Shirley Temple was spared from questioning by the Committee.45 
As a result of this investigation, ten Hollywood screenwriters were 
sentenced to between six and twelve months in prison for refusing to 
answer the Committee’s questions about their political affiliations and 
alleged ties with the Communist Party.46 The “Hollywood Ten,” as they 
would come to be called, claimed that they possessed a First Amendment 
right decline to respond to the questions because requiring them to do so 
would compromise their freedom of association.47
The governmental targeting of people who were suspected of 
holding communist views reached its zenith when in 1950 a Democratically 
led Congress overrode President Truman’s veto to pass the Internal Security 
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Act (ISA).48   The ISA required, among other things, that Communist 
organizations register with the Attorney  General.  It also called for the 
creation of the “Subversive Activities Control Board” (SACB) which was to 
be in charge of overseeing the registration procedure.  Any alien who was 
found to be a member of an organization investigated by the SACB was not 
allowed to become a U.S. citizen.  Furthermore, any naturalized citizen 
could be denaturalized in five years on the basis of their membership in any 
of the targeted groups.49 
 In view of the sweeping scope of the ISA, its 
constitutionality was challenged on various occasions on First Amendment 
grounds.  Even though the Supreme Court initially upheld the validity of the 
law,50 it ultimately struck down most of its provisions in several well-known 
cases.51  The Court put  the last nail on the ISA’s coffin in United States v. 
Robel52 , where it concluded that the ISA statute unconstitutionally 
“establishes guilt by association alone, without any need to establish that an 
individual's association poses the threat feared by the Government in 
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proscribing it.”53
 Despite the fact that most provisions of the ISA were 
eventually declared unconstitutional, the measures adopted by the 
government during the first decades of the Cold War represented a 
disturbing change in American policy.  Whereas the laws enacted in the 
name of national security  during the Quasi War and before and after World 
War I were specifically tailored to disaffect aliens, the anti-communist 
statutes enacted after the Second World War were designed to marginalize 
citizens on the basis of their affiliation with certain groups.  Some 
Americans finally had a taste of how it felt to be an outsider looking in.
2. RACIAL GROUPS AS OUTSIDERS– THE JAPANESE INTERNMENT CAMPS
 Americans linked to communist organizations were not  the 
only ones who received short shrift  as a result of the concerns over national 
security that emerged during World War II.  Americans of Japanese ancestry 
fared much worse.  On February  19, 1942, President Roosevelt issued 
Executive Order 906654, which authorized the military to prescribe areas 
“from which any  or all persons may be excluded, and with respect to which, 
the right of any person to enter, remain in, or leave shall be subject to 
whatever restriction the Secretary  of War or the appropriate Military 
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Commander may impose in his discretion.”55 
As it turned out, the Armed Forces ended up  designating the entire 
West Coast as a military area from which those with enemy race lineage 
(i.e. Japanese Americans) could be excluded.  What followed was one of the 
most disgraceful episodes in the history of the United States. In less than a 
year, military authorities had forcefully  displaced well over 100,000 
Japanese people and relocated them to several internment camps located in 
various states.  Nearly two-thirds of the internees were American citizens.56 
To add insult to injury, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality  of 
Executive Order 9066 in the now infamous decision of Korematsu v. United 
States57 on the grounds that the establishment of the internment camps was 
justified in virtue of military necessity.58
 Korematsu is now considered to be one of the worst opinions 
ever handed down by the Supreme Court.  One would believe that after 
apologizing to the survivors of the internment and awarding a Presidential 
Medal of Honor to the plaintiff in the Korematsu case, the government had 
come to the conclusion that adopting measures that inequitably target 
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certain groups of people during times of emergency was unwise. 
Nevertheless, in 2004 Fred Korematsu found himself filing an amicus 
curiae brief in the case of Rasul v. Bush59 opposing the government’s claim 
that it could indefinitely detain enemy combatants in Guantánamo Bay 
without allowing them to challenge the legality of their detention.  Much to 
Fred Korematsu’s surprise, the government was again employing the type of 
measures that led to his detention in the name of national security. 
C. ALIENS (MOSTLY MUSLIM) AS OUTSIDERS – GUANTÁNAMO BAY AND 
THE WAR ON TERROR
 September 11, 2001 changed the way Americans look at the 
world.  Airplanes and subways don’t seem to be as safe as we once thought 
they  were.  We are now willing to tolerate increased security measures at 
airports and train stations in order to minimize the possibility  of being the 
victim of another attack.  The attacks on the Twin Towers also changed the 
way that the government looks at things.  New tools are thought to be 
needed in order to wage the war on terrorism.  One of the government’s 
weapons of choice in this new war is instituting programs that  curtail the 
rights of aliens in an effort to gain intelligence that might prove to be crucial 
to stopping the next attack.  The establishment of prison facilities in 
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Guantánamo for the indefinite detention of enemy aliens constitutes the 
most poignant example of such efforts. 
 During the last  few years, the Executive Branch has 
vehemently argued that Guantánamo detainees have no access to federal 
courts by  claiming that foreigners detained as enemy combatants do not 
have a right to petition for habeas corpus, even though equally dangerous 
citizens detained in the same manner presumably do.  Fundamental to this 
claim is the government’s contention that aliens are not part  of “the people” 
protected by the Constitution of the United States.  As a result of this 
contractarian view of the bill of rights, on September 28, 2006, Congress 
passed the Military Commissions Act60, which, among other things, 
declares that no state or federal court  shall have jurisdiction to entertain a 
habeas corpus petition filed by non-citizens designated by the President as 
“enemy combatants.”  
 As we can see, history has a tendency to repeat  itself.  More 
than two hundred years ago, the American government unfairly targeted 
French aliens with the alleged purpose of guaranteeing the security of the 
rest of the populace.  Today we are targeting Muslim aliens in much the 
same manner for what essentially seem to be the same reasons.
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D. AMERICA’S EXPERIENCE WITH DISCOURSES OF EXCLUSION – 
PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS
This brief historical recount reveals that government has typically 
targeted groups of people in an inequitable manner as a way of attempting 
to neutralize what at the time appeared to be significant threats to the social 
order.  It is difficult to explain why the government has repeatedly decided 
to act in this way when it is perceived that our national security is 
threatened.  While racism61 and xenophobia62 can partially account for some 
of the measures that have been discussed here, there seems to be an even 
more fundamental explanation for these events.  Governmental authorities 
appear to believe that engaging in these types of acts during times of crisis 
can somehow make us safer.  If this is the case, various queries require our 
attention. The most fundamental of these is determining whether it  is true 
that engaging in such practices actually maximizes our security.  It is to this 
question that I now turn. 
III. THE PERILS OF UNFAIRLY TARGETING SOME GROUPS OF PEOPLE IN 
ORDER TO SAFEGUARD THE REST OF THE POPULACE
A. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
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Given that government tends to gravitate towards the inequitable 
targeting of allegedly  dangerous groups of people during times of crisis, it 
seems logical to ask whether doing so really helps us to successfully secure 
our nation.  In this section it will be argued that, contrary to what has 
traditionally  been contended by our government, engaging in these 
discriminatory practices is misguided because the benefits of making use of 
such practices have not been proven to outweigh the costs of implementing 
them.  For the purposes of this discussion, I will assume that the objective 
of targeting some people in order to protect the rights of many is to secure 
the continued existence of the State by preventing extremely harmful 
attacks from being carried out and not to further racist agendas.63 
Furthermore, I will avoid delving into the constitutional questions 
that engaging in such acts raises because those who have advocated its use 
clearly  believe that there is a law of necessity that trumps the provisions of 
the Constitution that might be nominally  infringed during times of national 
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emergency.64  Thus, in an effort to engage in a fruitful exchange with those 
who believe that employing the insider/outsider distinction is sometimes an 
indispensable tool in the fight to secure our nation in moments of crisis, I 
will steer clear of deontological arguments based on the inviolability  of 
certain constitutional rights and will focus on advancing consequentialist 
arguments that show that  unfairly  burdening some groups of people as a 
mechanism for maximizing the security of those not burdened by the 
measures is unwise. 
B. THE REINFORCED BELIEFS ARGUMENT
 One of the major drawbacks of excluding some groups from having 
access to the full protection of our laws as a way to protect the security of 
the rest of the population is that the strategy can backfire because of what I 
call the “reinforced beliefs argument.”  In the context of terrorism, the 
argument can be summed up in the following manner:
(1) Terrorists firmly believe that the people they are attacking 
deserve to be harmed because they  are members of a State (or 
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people) that they consider to be acting immorally or 
unjustifiably.
(2) When the country  that is threatened by  the possibility  of an 
attack resorts to   measures that inequitably target  certain groups 
of people it reinforces the terrorists’ beliefs that  the country  they 
purport to attack acts in an immoral manner.
(3) Thus, requiring that a particular group of people carry a greater 
burden than the rest  of the populace might lead to an increase of 
attacks because it  strengthens the convictions of terrorists’ 
regarding the immorality of the State that they purport to attack. 
The recent American experience with terrorism lends credence to the 
validity  of the first premise of the reinforced beliefs argument.  It is 
common knowledge that Al-Qaeda “motivate[s] their members through 
claims that the West has socially, economically and politically humiliated 
Islamic society.”65  This leads members of the organization to believe that 
killing innocent civilians in these western countries, particularly  the United 
States, is morally  justified because these innocent civilians are in some way 
associated with the allegedly humiliating acts that their country has 
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performed.  It also seems to be true that this belief is usually the product of 
deeply held political and/or religious convictions that are not easily 
manipulated or changed. 
As a result of this, it seems fair to conclude, as is posited in the 
second premise of the argument, that  targeting foreigners (especially 
Muslim aliens) by restricting their liberties more than the rest of the 
population will reinforce Al-Qaeda’s claim that the United States debases 
Islamic communities.  The treatment of the predominantly Muslim aliens 
detained in Guantánamo Bay presents a case in point.  The evidently 
discriminatory treatment of these detainees only seems to confirm our 
enemy’s claim that we humiliate foreigners, especially  Muslims.  This, in 
turn, validates their beliefs about the immorality of our country.66 
If it is true that inequitably targeting certain groups can lead to a 
corroboration of the claims of immorality  put forth by our enemies, then 
making use of such measures as a way to combat terrorism might be 
counterproductive in two ways.  First, it might lead to engendering more 
resolute terrorists who have found in America’s use of exclusionary 
measures an additional reason for attacking the country.  Second, it  might 
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provide some individuals who previously had no intention of attacking our 
country  with new reasons to believe that the use of force against our nation 
is morally justifiable.67 
C. THE SUBSTITUTION ARGUMENT
Adopting measures that target some groups of people to the 
exclusion of others presents a further problem which can be illustrated by 
what I call the “substitution argument”.  In a nutshell, the substitution 
argument holds that restricting the liberties of some during times of national 
emergency does not make us safer because those intent on harming us will 
readily adapt by looking for people in the non-excluded groups who will 
help  them carry out their plans.  The effect of this is that members of the 
targeted class will be substituted by people who are not being targeted in an 
attempt to circumvent the precautionary measures undertaken by  the 
country.   
The Israeli experience with terrorism lends support to the 
aforementioned argument.  Take, for example, the notorious case of Kozo 
Okamoto.68  Okamoto orchestrated a terrorist attack that  took place on May 
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30, 1972, at Israel’s Lod Airport in Tel Aviv.  After getting off Air France’s 
Flight 132 to Tel-Aviv, Okamoto and his accomplices proceeded to the 
baggage claim area where they took machine guns and hand grenades from 
their suitcases and opened fire on the people in the terminal.  After all was 
said and done, Okamoto had killed twenty-six innocent civilians, mostly 
Puerto Rican Christians on their way back from a pilgrimage to sacred sites 
in Israel. It turned out that Okamoto, who was a member of the Japanese 
Red Army, was sponsored by  the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP).  The PFLP obviously decided to sponsor Okamoto and 
his Japanese co-conspirators in an attempt to avoid raising suspicions about 
the impending attack.  The strategy worked, for Okamoto and his gang 
attracted little attention before the terrorist acts took place.
The Okamoto case exemplifies a paradigmatic instance of 
substitution, in which the terrorist PFLP successfully managed to take 
advantage of the fact that Israeli authorities were focusing their 
counterterrorism efforts on identifying potentially dangerous Middle 
Eastern men by encouraging people from a different race than the one being 
targeted by the authorities to engage in acts of terrorism. 
The recent rise of terrorist acts perpetrated by women represents 
another example of how organizations adopt substitution techniques as a 
34 Outsiders Looking In 
way of frustrating governmental attempts to secure their nation by 
disproportionately burdening people from a particular demographic group. 
In 2002, for example, the world was surprised when it was confirmed that 
close to 20 women took part in the taking of 700 hostages in a Moscow 
theater.  That same year, the first female suicide bombers appeared in Israel. 
The increase in attacks carried out by women is, at least in part, the product 
of the conscious decision of terrorist organizations to recruit people who are 
not being targeted by the government in an attempt to sidestep preventive 
security measures.  Hence, as it has been pointed out:
After the attacks of Sept. 11, the security measures introduced at 
airports, train stations and other public places were geared toward 
the perpetrators of the hijackings. As all the members of the group 
around Mohammed Atta were young, male and of Middle Eastern 
origin (as well as appearance), it  was little surprise that this became 
the prototype at which law enforcement agencies around the world 
were looking most closely. Terror networks like Al Qaeda were 
quick to spot  this vulnerability, and consequently set  out to recruit 
operatives who did not fit the standard description.69
 The conscious effort  made by terrorist networks to employ 
techniques of substitution as a way to exploit the vulnerabilities of security 
measures that rely heavily on the targeting of a particular group of people as 
presumptively  dangerous individuals demonstrates the potentially 
catastrophic shortcomings of such measures.  Consequently, as a result of 
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substitution techniques, disproportionately  targeting certain demographic 
groups might make us less safe in the long run.  
C. THE LEGITIMACY ARGUMENT
Disproportionately  targeting certain groups of the population during 
a time of crisis is also problematic because of what I call the “legitimacy 
argument.”  The following example illustrates the considerations 
underpinning the argument.  Those who have recently taken the New York 
City  subway have probably  seen an ad posted in some subway cars by  the 
city’s Metropolitan Transit Authority  (MTA) that features photographs of a 
dozen sets of eyes with the headline “There are 16 million eyes in the city. 
We’re counting on all of them.”70  According to the MTA, the purpose of 
the ad is to “remind customers of the need to stay  aware of their 
surroundings and to report anything suspicious.”71  Evidently, the point of 
the message is to stress the fact that  cooperation of the city’s residents and 
visitors with local authorities is vital to ensuring security. 
It should be noted, however, that such cooperation can only  be 
expected if the people believe that the government is acting in a legitimate 
manner.  Thus, if local law enforcement authorities are perceived to be 
acting illegitimately, the prospects for cooperation from subway riders 
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diminish.  As Professor Strauss has stated, “the characteristic feature of a 
claim of illegitimacy is the assertion that, as a moral matter, full obedience 
[to a governmental act] is not required”.72  Thus, obedience to authorities 
and cooperation with the government decreases as the perceived legitimacy 
of law enforcement agencies diminishes. 
Once one accepts that an increase in the perceived illegitimacy of a 
government augments the probability that the people will not obey 
authorities, it  is easy  to see why adopting measures that inequitably burden 
some groups of people will probably reduce cooperation of the populace 
with the State.  Selectively targeting a group  of people will almost 
inevitably alienate a substantial portion of the targeted population.  This 
makes us less safe because it diminishes the probability that members of the 
alienated group will cooperate with the police and other law enforcement 
agencies in their attempts to prevent attacks.  The following example 
provided by Professors Tyler and Fagan explains this phenomenon:
Thinking that one has been stopped by the police because of one’s 
ethnicity reflects the belief that one has been profiled.  This 
judgment has negative consequences during personal encounters 
with the police, because it  encourages resistance and antagonism, as 
well as undermining the legitimacy of the police.  On the 
community  level, if members of the community believe that 
profiling is widespread, they  are less supportive of the police.  These 
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profiling effects emerge because people view profiling as an unfair 
policing procedure.73 
 The pernicious effects of unfairly targeting some social groups as a 
mechanism for maximizing our security  are exacerbated by the fact that the 
people whose cooperation authorities typically need the most are precisely 
those who are being targeted.  If it is true that those who are being targeted 
constitute a particularly  dangerous group of people, then it should follow 
that the government should not want to alienate those who are in a 
particularly privileged position to observe suspicious activity that, if 
communicated to the police in a timely fashion, might lead to the prevention 
of attacks on the community. 
 The abovementioned problem is compounded when one considers 
that cooperation from other countries, especially Middle Eastern states, 
which is also essential to our efforts to minimize the occurrence of terrorist 
attacks in our country, is probably lessened when we make use of the 
measures that are being critiqued here.  The reason for this is that unfairly 
targeting certain portions of the population breeds anti-American sentiment 
across the globe, particularly  in the countries of origin of those who are 
targeted the most. 
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 In short, adopting measures during times of crisis that unfairly 
burden a particular group of people emasculates our legitimacy both 
domestically and internationally.  This will in all probability hinder our 
efforts to secure our nation because it will undercut local and foreign 
cooperation with our government. 
E. THE PRESUMPTION ARGUMENT
 I have chosen to dub the last argument that I will advance against 
the practice of unfairly targeting certain groups of people during times of 
emergency “the presumption argument.” It can be summarized in the 
following manner:
(1) Since acts that inequitably burden some groups of people have 
unquestionable adverse effects on the targeted group, engaging in such acts 
is presumptively wrong. 
(2) Government can justifiably  engage in presumptively wrongful 
conduct if it can demonstrate that the adverse effects of performing the act 
are offset by the benefits it generates.
(3) An answer to the question about whether the benefits of targeting 
certain groups of people during times of crisis outweigh the costs is elusive 
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because there is currently no way of meaningfully  assigning probabilities to 
the possible beneficial effects of engaging in such a practice.74
(4) Thus, the government cannot justify  the practice because it  has 
no way of proving that doing so will have a beneficial effect, whereas there 
is little doubt that doing so will adversely affect the members of the group 
being targeted.
The first  premise of the argument creates a presumption against 
adopting measures that inequitably target members of a particular group of 
people in light of its manifestly  adverse effects.  Since the negative effects 
of such acts are well documented, there is no need to go over them in detail 
here.  It suffices to say  that engaging in these types of acts surely has the 
following detrimental effects: (1) it contributes to the stigmatization of the 
group being targeted;75 (2) it generates feelings of resentment on the part of 
the targeted people; and (3) it restricts the rights or benefits of the members 
of the targeted group.  It thus seems sensible to conclude that, in light of the 
aforementioned considerations, the costs of engaging in these acts are not 
small or negligible.  This should lead us to deem such acts as prima facie or 
presumptively wrongful. 
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With regard to the second premise, it  seems to be obvious that the 
State should be able to inequitably  target certain groups of people only if it 
can show that doing so is in the best  interests of society as a whole.  This 
dovetails with the case law that requires courts to inquire whether a 
governmental act that discriminates on the basis of race or another of the so-
called suspect classifications is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling 
state interest.  In such cases, the courts are called to balance the negative 
consequences of discrimination against the positive aspects that the act 
seeks to produce.  If the adverse effects of the conduct are thought to 
outweigh its potential benefits, the governmental act will be invalidated 
under the Equal Protection Clause.76   The contention defended here is 
similar.  As a result of the non-negligible costs of engaging in acts that 
inequitably target certain groups of people, the State should be required to 
satisfactorily prove that performing such acts “meets other social goals in a 
way [that can] overcome [the adverse effects of the act].”77 
The third premise is grounded on the fact that deciding if the 
targeting of certain social groups will contribute to achieving a socially 
desirable outcome is impracticable because there does not currently  seem to 
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be a way of adequately  quantifying the benefits that such a policy might 
engender.  It is not altogether clear, for example, whether the en masse 
preventive detention of non-citizens carried out by the United States 
government in the wake of 9/11 has led to any tangible benefits.  Since the 
attacks on the World Trade Center, more than 5,000 aliens have been 
preventively detained.  As of the moment that this article was written, none 
of those detentions has culminated in the conviction of a person for 
engaging in a terrorist act.78   This, of course, does not mean that the 
detentions have not yielded any  benefits.  As we all know, it  is usually very 
difficult to prove a negative.  It cannot be ruled out that the preventive 
detention of aliens after 9/11 has spawned non-trivial benefits despite the 0 
for 5000 statistic.  However, statistics such as these do appear to highlight 
the fact that it is very difficult to express in objective terms whether such 
conduct actually  produces positive consequences.  Contrarily, quantifiable 
information tending to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of these strategies 
abounds.  Besides the abovementioned statistic, one could point out  that the 
federal government’s “Special Registration Program,” which targeted men 
from Muslim and Arab countries by requiring them to be fingerprinted, 
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photographed and interviewed, has failed to produce a single charge of 
terrorism related activity even though over 80,000 people were targeted.79 
If we couple these figures with the reinforced beliefs, substitution 
and legitimacy arguments discussed in the previous subsections, the benefits 
of targeting certain groups, whether it  is because they are aliens (preventive 
detention statistic) or because they are part of a particular ethnic group 
(Special Registration program statistic), are, at  the very least, unclear. 
Consequently, it  is fair to state that it cannot be objectively concluded that 
the benefits of employing such measures outweigh the costs, for although 
the drawbacks of engaging in such a tactic seem evident, the benefits of 
doing so do not. 
Once we accept the abovementioned premises, the conclusion set 
forth in (4) should naturally  follow.  If unfairly targeting certain groups of 
people is presumptively wrong and the government cannot demonstrate in a 
meaningful manner that engaging in such an act  furthers some other societal 
goal, the conduct  should not be allowed.  Since the government should only 
be permitted to perform prima facie wrongful acts when it can afford 
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reasons that justify the conduct all things being considered, the failure to 
provide such reasons should lead to a rejection of the practice.80 
V. THE SECURITY FENCE ACT OF 2006 – A CASE STUDY ON THE PERILS 
OF THE LEGAL DISCOURSE OF EXCLUSION
The best way to illustrate the arguments advanced in Part IV against 
the judiciousness of adopting measures that inequitably  target certain 
groups during times of crisis is by  way of a recent example.  Less than a 
year ago, Congress enacted the Security Fence Act of 2006 (SFA), which 
authorizes the construction of a 700 mile wall along the U.S.-Mexico 
border.  Many lawmakers seem to believe that erecting such a structure will, 
among other things, minimize the possibility of a terrorist attack because, as 
U.S. Representative Duncan Hunter (R-CA) has stated, “fences would be a 
hindrance to terrorists should they decide to come across a land border 
between the U.S. and Mexico and to California.”81  The SFA has alienated 
Mexicans and Latinos both here and abroad, who wonder why  the 
government had specifically  chosen to target their border even though the 
border with Canada is three times longer than the one with Mexico. 
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80 Durlauf, supra note 74, p. 6.
81 John Hawkin’s telephone interview with Congressman Duncan Hunter. An edited 
transcript of the interview can be found in http://rightwingnews.com/interviews/
duncanhunter.php. 
The absence of a fence with our friends to the north will likely cause 
our potential attackers to adapt by attempting to enter our country through 
Canada instead of Mexico.  This constitutes a classic example of 
substitution techniques that might be used by terrorists as a way to get 
around measures like the SFA.  The foolishness of believing that the SFA 
will lead to a reduction in terrorism is further highlighted by the fact that 
none of the people who have attempted to commit acts of terrorism in the 
United States have come through Mexico, whereas at least one entered the 
country through the Canadian border.82 
Construction of the wall could also end up hurting our national 
security initiatives, for it  will likely lead to a deterioration of U.S-Mexico 
relations during a time when close collaboration between both countries is 
critical to waging the war against terror.  This fear has been corroborated by 
the concerns voiced by the two most recent Mexican presidents who have 
denounced the idea of building a wall to separate the two countries as 
“shameful,”83  “deplorable,”84  and as a mistake akin to the building of the 
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Berlin wall.85  Breeding such feelings of resentment amongst the Mexican 
people could undercut our efforts to secure the nation, since it will likely 
diminish the perceived legitimacy of American strategies to fight terrorism. 
If this were to happen, one should expect cooperation of Mexicans and 
Hispanics with our government to decrease as well. Given that Latinos 
account for over 15% of the population of the United States, it does not 
seem like a good idea to enact measures that tend to alienate them.  This is 
especially the case when the benefits of adopting such measures remain 
unclear.
Since the SFA has both the likelihood of increasing the use of 
substitution techniques that might encourage potential terrorists to enter the 
country  by crossing the Canadian border and the potential for reducing 
Hispanic cooperation with law enforcement authorities, it could very well 
be the case that the law might actually make us less safe.  Such is the 
paradoxical nature of governmental acts that inequitably  burden a particular 
group of people with the alleged purpose of promoting the security of the 
rest of the population.  They tend to achieve exactly the opposite of what 
was intended by those that promoted their adoption.   
46 Outsiders Looking In 
85 Id. 
CONCLUSION
 During the last two hundred years, our government has frequently 
enacted measures that unfairly burden certain social groups during times of 
crisis.  The historical analysis set  forth in Part II of this article reveals that 
adoption of such measures is usually justified by an appeal to national 
security.  Thus, we have been told that  we need to exclude some groups 
from the full protection of our laws in order to guarantee the safety of the 
rest of the populace.
 I believe that this is a false dichotomy.  There is no need to 
debate whether we should inequitably target certain groups of people as a 
way to maximize our security  because there is no hard evidence tending to 
prove that doing so will really  make us safer.  Moreover, it seems that in 
light of the reinforced beliefs, legitimacy, substitution and presumption 
arguments advanced in Part IV, there is reason to believe that adopting such 
laws will make us less secure in the long run.
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